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Studies of the.socia1 correlates of political party choice in the 
Western industrial nations have progressed from identifying zero-order 
main effects (e.g., the relationship between social class and partisan- 
ship assuming all other things to be equal), through: identifying first- 
and higher-order main effects (e.g., partialling out the variance at- 
tributable to occupation, income, education, etc.), to the theoretical 
specification of statistical interaction effects among structural vari- 
ables that have potential consequences beyond those predicted by an ad- 
ditive model dealing only with main effects. This newest class of models 
suggest unique effects on party choice of the configuration of a person's 
position4 on two or more structural variables. The primary purpose of this 
paper is to compare the efficiency of two such interaction-imodels, social 
mobility and status inconsistency, for explaining the structure of polit- 
ical party support in Germany, as against the efficiency of additive 
models containing only main effects. 
SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND POLITICAL PARTISANSHIP IN GERMANY 
. . 
The relationship between social structure and political partisan- 
ship in Germany has not been a stationary one over the last several year's. 
It has been stable, however, in the sense that the same set of variables 
. seem to consistently account for differences in voter preference for the 
two major parties. The factors that predispose an individua1,to support 
the Social Democratic Party (SPD) include: working class occupation; 
non-Catholic religion or non-practicing Catholic; trade union aff+liation; 
identification with the working class; working class social origins. The 
factors that predispose an individual to support the Christian Democratic 
Union (CDU) , on the other hand, inciude : middle class . occupation:; Catho- 
lic religion, particularly if practicing; no trade union affiliation; 
identification with the middle-class; middle-class social origins (Segal, 
1967; Liepelt, 1968). Liepelt and Mitscherlich (1968) have suggested 
that these factors are indicative of the social networks that influence 
a person's political orientation. 
Klingemann and Pappi (1970) note that voter alignments in Bundestag 
elections shifted through the 1960's in favor of the SPD, with the CDU 
suffering slight losses, and the small Free Democratic Party suffering 
the greatest losses, exceeding the 5 percent of the total vote needed 
for entry into the Bundestag by only .8% in 1969. The dynamic behind the 
growth of the SPD seems to be the decline of its image as a working-class 
party. Between 1965 and 1969, the SPD share of the white-collar vote 
increased from'-28% to 45%. This embourgeoisement of the party of the 
left is not unlike the shifting base of support of the Democratic Parsy in 
the United States. The important question for our purposes is whether ok- 
cupation still differentiates SPD from CDU supporters, albeit less strongly 
than before. 
SOCIAL MOBILITY AND POLITICAL PARTISANSHIP 
While models dealing with the additive main effects of structural 
variables on partisanship are most frequently interpreted as reflections 
of static social cleavages, statistical interaction models tend to be 
based on assumptions of dynamic social processes. Models of the political 
effects of intergenerational social mobility are one class of such approach- 
es. Lipset and Zetterberg (1956), and Bendix and Lipset (1959) suggest 
that Americans upwardly mobile into the middle-class become more political- 
ly conservative than non-mobile individuals born into the middle class. 
Upwardly mobile Europeans,:however, are more politically radical than 
non-mobile people in their class of destination (Tumin, 1967: 64; Lopreato, 
1967). The dynamic assumed to be operating is that upwardly mobile people 
seek acceptance by the higher status occupational group that they have 
entered through conformity to its norms. In the United States they are ac- 
cepted, and indeed over~conform to the norms, but in the more status-rigid 
European societies they are not accepted in their new occupational class -- 
a fact that is subsequently reEIected in their politics; Downwardly mobile 
individuals, by contrast, are expected to retain the conservative political 
orientation of their class of origin, and not reflect the,occupational 
status of their class of destination. 
The bulk of the empirical evidence, developed using crude two- 
. . .  . .  . . ,  . - - . .  . . .. - 
class stiatificatidh kbdels (blue-collar and white-collar) dGes no; supPo;; 
this model. Rather, a series.of studies have shown that in both America 
and Europe, the party choice of mobile individuals is intermediate between 
that of non-mobile people in the class of origin, and that of non-mobile 
people in the class of destination (Blau, 1956; Lopreato, 1967; Segal 
and Knoke, 1968; Thompson, 1971a, 1971b). The most parsimonious explanation 
for these findings was that the partisanship of the mobile individuals 
could be explained by a model in'cluding only the additive main effects 
of class of origin and class of destination. While the relative importance 
of these two components might differ from country to country, no assumption 
of statistical interaction was required to explain the findings. 
Janowitz (1958) has demonstrated the high level of intergenerational 
mobility in post-World \Jar 11-Germany. ,He found, .using a four=class model 
of nonfarm occupational stratification, that in 1955, only 55.4% of his 
sample were in the same strata as their fathers had occupied. Interest- 
ingly, there was as much downward as upward mobility, although both the 
amount and direction of mobility were confounded by migration. More 
importantly, for our purposes, Janowitz found political consequences 
of social mobility in Germany. The small right-wing political parties 
had the highest concentration of downwardly mobile people, while the 
liberal FDP had an overrepresentation of upwardly mobile supporters. 
Unfortunately, Janowitz' data are not presented in a form that allows 
us to compare the main effects of strata of origin and destination with 
the effects of mobility. 
STATUS INCONSISTENCY AND POLITICAL PARTISANSHIP 
A second set of models, related to but conceptually distinct from 
social mobility, deal with the political consequences of status inconsis- 
tency. Here the concern is not with discontinuities between an individual's 
occupational status and his father's occupational status, but rather 
with the relationship between his occupational prestige and his concurrent 
status situation on other dimensions of the stratification system. 
Briefly stated, the theory of status inconsistency argues that if 
an individual is of high status on one prestige dimension and of low status on 
another, he will experience stress (Jackson, 1962). It is assumed that a 
person in such a situation will tend to define himself in terms of his 
higher status, and will expect deference on that basis (Lenski, 1966: 26). 
Other people, however, are likely to define him in terms of his lower 
status, frustrating his deference expectations, producing the hypothesized 
stress, and causing him to withdraw.from social participation. 
Recent research has thrown this assumed dynamic into question. 
Segal, Segal, and Knoke (1970) suggest that the status inconsistent indi- 
vidual does not define himself in terms of his higher status, and that 
other people do not define him in.terms of his lower status. Laumann and 
Segal (1971)~ moreover, have shown that status inconsistency does not seem 
to bq related to rates of social participation. 
These findings notwithstanding, a large body of literature suggests 
that certain traits may-be characteristic of status inconsistent individuals. 
Among these characteristics is support of left-of-center political parties. 
In an analysis of 25 national surveys of voting behavior in the United 
States, Canada, Britain, and Australia, Lenski (1967) found that in all of 
the Anglo-American democracies except Britain, inconsistencies between oc- 
cupational class and socio-religious grouping increased liberal or.left- 
of-center tendencies.. In general, such results have been produced as the 
result of inconsistencies between a high achieved status (education, occu- 
pation, income) and a low sscribed' status (race, religion, ethnicity) . 
Attempts to replicate Lenski's findings have placed important limit- 
ationg on the generality of his results. In America, Segal (1969) and 
Laumann and Segal (1971) suggest that the status inconsltency model works 
only'when the low-ascribed status is socially visible (non-white racial 
status; Jewish religion). In the Australian case, Broom and Jones (1970) 
find that inconsistency between a high achieved status (education, occupa- 
tion, or income) and a low ascribed status is related to liberal political 
preference, and that the inconsistency model explains significantly more 
variance in partisanship than does a simple additive status model. However, 
the increas? in the multiple correlation coefficient over a purely additive 
model including the. effects of religion is only .002, and the authors note 
that much of the variance attributed to the inconsistency term is variance 
that is shared with the dummy religion variable. 
In.Canada, Segal (1970) has demonstrated significant status inconsistency 
effects on political partisanship. However, he has suggested that the 
s$atistical significance of the inconsistency coefffc5ent,.~Ya~- dependent::l:.:,- 
on':the.-.large size of his case base. In terms of magnitude, the main status 
effects, and the effect of religion in particular, were of primary importance. 
Two previous studies have explored the political consequences of 
status inconsistency in Germany. Stehr (1971), analyzing data from a Cologne 
sample interviewed in 1967, found no relationship between "objective" status 
inconsistency, as generally measured by social researchers, and "subjective" 
status inconsistency, as perceived by his respondents. He furthermore found 
no relationship between subjective inconsistency and measures of either 
social interaction or liberalism. It should be noted that the status 
measures used by Stehr included only achievement-oriented dimensions 
(occupation, education, income). Since the theory of status inconsistency 
'in its current form stresses the importance of low ascribed status, we 
cannot discount the presence of status inconsistency effects in Germany on 
the basis of this study. 
Maza (1970), on the other hand, recognized the importance of ascribed 
status in the inconsistency formulation. Using religion and sex as ascribed 
statuses in the German context, she re-analyzed the German data from the 
five-nation study of civic culture carried out by Almond and Verba (1963). 
Inconsistencies between the ascribed status variables and occupation, in- 
: come and education were found to be significantly related to political 
frustration, and the effects tended to be greater than those predicted 
by .a simple additive model. While we regard Maza's sPmple di,chotomization of 
. . . . 
. . reli-gious denominations as perhaps too simplistic, and the role of sex a 
. . 
confounding rather than a clarifying one, we believe that her results justify 
looking further at the consequences of the inconsistency phenomenon in the 
German case. 
DATA 
In the transitional period of women's: liberation, as sexual equality 
is approached in the Western industrial nations, the social statgs of 
women is nonetheless difficult to estimate. They may inherit their status 
from their fathers, or, if.m&rried, share the status of their husbands, or, 
if employed, define their own position in the stratification system. To 
avdid these problematic aspects of stratification,we confined our analysis 
. to male respondents. In order to attain sufficient cases to sustain 
analysis, we combined the samples of two surveys carried out by the Institut 
fur angewandte Sozialwissenschaft (infas) in April (no. 15a) and June (no, 2la) 
1971, respectively. The two samples had been drawn on the basis of equiva- 
lent sampling frames, and represent cross-sections of the German electorate. 
Of the total 2,149 completed interviews, 1,052 were with male respondents. 
The respondents were abked "which (political) party strikes you 
as the best at this time?" Responses to this question, scaled from the left 
$0 the right of the political spectrum, are presented in Table 1. Note 
that.we'place.the FDP between the two.major parties, reflecting the fluctu- 
ation of its policies along the liberalism-conservatism dimension. 
, 
- 
Table 1. Distribution of Political Party Preference in Germany 
Party No. of supporters in Sample 
" DFU, DKP, ADF, SED 4 
. . 
. . SPD 529 
FDP 37 
. . NDP 
Other, none* 
Total 1,052 
. . . *This category is omitted .from the following analysis, leaving a sample of 993. 
Our first analytical task was to ascertain the main effects of 
stratification variables on party:choice. These effects were calculated 
using - multiple - classification - analysis (MCA).  MCA is a linear analysis 
model capable of handling missing data, non-linear data, and nominal in- 
dependent variables, with the accuracy of least squares methods. It can 
be conceived of as a form of dummy variable multiple regression in which 
party choice is regressed on occupation, father's occupation, religion, 
education, and income. The coefficients obtained through MCA are analogous 
to those obtained through dummy variable regression. The coefficients 
derived from either of these techniques may in fact be easily converted 
to the other by the addition or subtraction of a constant for each pre- 
dictor (Andrews, et.al., 1967). The results of this analysis are presented 
in Table 2. 
Table 2. E£ fects of Stratification Variables on Political 
Partisanship in.the Federal' Republic of Germany 
Stratification Variables 
. . ., , - ... ,-.-. father';$?.- 
. . . .  . . . . - . . - -. - 
occupation occupation education income religion 
eta* .224 .215 .I19 .I30 .I57 
F test for gross 
effects p < .001 p <. 001 pe.01 n.s. pe.001 
beta .I89 .I57 .097 .093 .I51 
F test for 
net effects p4.001 p4.001 p d. 05 n.s. pe.001 
unadjusted multiple r2 (proportion of explained variance) = ,117 
2 
multiple r adjusted for degrees.~of freedom = .096 
*Eta measures zero-order relationships between specified. predictor 
variables and party choice. Beta measures the partial relationships, 
when the effects of all other variables are controlled. 
As these data show, social class, measured either by respondent's occupation 
cjr by his father's occupation, was an important determinant of political 
party preference in Germany in 1971. The relationship between occupation 
and party choice seems to be less strong than it was in the early 1960's , 
(cf.,Segal, 1967), confirming the observations of Klingemann and Pappf 
(1970), and of Lipset (1964). At the same time, the relationship, although 
weakened, persists nonetheless. It is therefore premature to argue that 
the age of class conflict manifested through partisan politics has come to 
an end (Janowitz and Segal, 1967). Moreover, our analysis does not portend 
an age of consensus, .for while social class differences between the parties 
are 'declining, religion remains an important plane of cleavage (cf. Lane, 1965). 
The data in Table 2 suggest that occupation is the strongest predictor 
of party preference of the variables considered. To the extent that multi- 
collinearity exists among our predictors, beta cannot be taken as a measure 
of the variance explained'-by each predictor, although it does indicate 
the .relative strength of the partial relationships. In the current study, 
multicollinearity is to be expected, since elements of the stratification 
system are generally intercorrelated. In particular, in any study of social mo- 
bility, we would anticipate some degree of social immobility. Table 3 
presents mobility data for 676 men in our sample who reported urban occu- 
pations for themselves and their fathers. 
Table 3. Social ~obility in Germany, 1971 
Occupation of Father 
(1) Self-employed, (2) Employees, (3) Workers Total 
free professional, officials, 
kindred civil servants 
Occupation (1) 40 2 9 2 0 89 
Son (3) 3 9 
Total 124 
Omitted from this table are 174 respondents who did not report their own 
occupations, or who reported occupations not classified here, 25 respondents 
who did not report their father's occupations, 5 respondents who reported 
neither their own nor their father's occupations;and 113 sons of fariners. 
The data indicate a considerable degree of immobility in the urban 
labor force. Seventy-one percent of the sons of workers are workers 
themselves, and 62% of the sons of employees and bureaucrats share their 
father's occupations. Only among the sons of the self-employed do we 
find mobility to be the modal pattern. Here, only 32% have inherited 
their father's occupations, while 36%:.have followed more bureaucratic 
.callings.   his reflects shifts in the structure of the labor force from 
an-:entrepreneurial to a bureaucratic orientation between the two genera- 
tions represented here (see Segal, forthcoming, for ant overview of these 
processes). 
At the same time, it would be incorrect to characterize the German 
labor force as a stationary system. Rather, there seems to be a relatively 
stable level of intergenerational occupational mobility in Germany over 
- time. Lipset and Bendix (1964: 17), reviewing data from the mid-19501s, 
suggest that in Germany between 26 and 30% of the sons of manual workers 
achieved non-manual positions. The figure in our 1971 data is 29%. With 
regard to downward mobility, 25% of the sons of bureaucrats, and 31% of 
the sons of entrepreneurs and free professional in our 1971 sample find 
themselves in manual positions. Again, these figures are similar to the 
range of 20 - 38% found by Lipset and Bendix in three sets of ~erman data 
(cf . Kleining , :'.1971) .
We used MCA to.analyze the effects of respondent's occupation and 
father's occupation on partisanship for the 676 men in our sample for 
whom we had occupational data over two generations. With the case base 
reduced, and other variables excluded, the etas were reduced to ,206 and 
:173, respectively, and the betas to .I62 and ,107. The unadjusted R Z 
was .052, indicating that the additive mobility model explains more than 
pne-half the variance accounted for by the full five variable model 
(Table 2). Occupational destination accounts for considerably more unique?- 
variance than oc2upational origin.. However, an almost equal proportion of 
the variance explained is shared by origin and destination and cannot be 
apprtioned. 
. .  One o£ the ~trengths of MCA is its assumption of additivity of main 
effects. By assuming only row effects and column effzcts in an r x c table, 
MCA utilizes only'r + c - 2 degrees of freedom. Standard analysis of 
jariance (ANOVA) would require examination of each ca.tegory mean util- ij ' 
izing r.x c - 1, and leading to rapid exhaustion of the data and unrelia- 
bility. The argument regarding mobility effects, however, is rooted in 
the presence or absence of patterned statistical interaction effects (Blalock, 
1967a). It therefore becomes necessary to measure departures from the 
additive model. Comparison of calculated with observed'partisanship means 
for each cell ij in the origin x destination tabde (Table 4 j  yields a set 
A 
df cell mean deviations (7 - Y. .) . The statistical significance of the 
ij 1J 
deviations from additivity is evaluated using the F-test for interaction 
in ANOVA with unequal cell frequencies (Brownlee, 1960: ch. 19; Duncan, 1966). 
- 2 
The sum of squares for the additive model ,En2, - Y. . )  , is subtracted 
3 2J 
from rhe observed sum of squares x n .  (yii - Y. . ) , and this difference is 
1 I 
tested for significance using the F-distr-ibution as the criterion. Where 
the interaction term is significant, the additive model does not account 
fully for the observed cell variations. Alternative hypotheses can then be 
investigated in an attempt to relate the::.interaction systematically to 
mobility. 




Occupation of Father 
(1) Self-employed, (2) Employees, (3) Workers - - . 
Free professional, Officials, Total 
Kindred -- - Civil servants 
Occupation (1) 3.450 2.828 3.200 3.191 
Son (3) 2.872 2.755 2.550 2.620 
Total 3.032 2.939 2.639 2.806 
Our analysis of variance for mobility effects is presented in Table 5. 
Unlike our earlier analysis, here we find that only respondents' occupation 
(occupation of destination) has a significant main effect on party preference. 
There is no. significant increment for father's occupation or for the incer- 
action of,>origin and destination. Thus, our data go beyond the position 
taken by Hodge (1970) that "mobility" does not have an effect of its own, 
but rather represents the linearly additive effects of the variables used 
to define it. Not only do we fail to find "mobility effects", but under 
close statistical scrutiny, occupational origins fail to contribute a main 
additive effect. This finding bears a close parallel to the dominant pattern 
in the United States, both in terms of the absence of statistically signifi- 
cant interaction effects, and in the amount of variance accounted for in 
partisanship (4%) by current occupation (cf. hoke, forthcoming). 
Table 5. Analysis of Variance for Party Identification by Occupational 
Origins and Destinations 
Source of Variation Sum of Squares Degrees of Mean F-ratio 
Freedom Squares 
Total (T) 651.62 6 75 
MCA origin, destination 
(A,B) 33.62 4 
Origin x destination(AB) 43.08 8 
origin (A) 18.90 2 
Destination (B) 28.82 2 
Tests 
I. Increment for origin 
(A, B-B) 4.80 2 
Remainder.. 
(T3 -(A,B');r 
11. Increment for destination 
( A y  B-A) 14.72 
Remainder 
(T)-(A,BD 
111. Increment for interaction 
(AB-A , B) 9.46 4 
Remainder 
(T) - (AB) 608.54 66 7 
*p <.001 
The identification of status inconsistency effects is statikti2;llly 
similar to the identification of mobility effects (Blalock, 1966, 1967a, 
1967b). There are conceptual differences with regard to the component 
status dimensions, however, that demand a somewhat different research 
strategy. Interpretation of the ascriptive status dimension (religion) is 
based upon the presence or absence of membership in the dominant religious 
group. Religious dominance, however, varies among the German states. We 
therefore carried out our analyses separately for those states with a 
Catholic majority (primarily in southern Germany) and those with a Protes- 
tant majority (primarily in the north). We recognize the existence of 
large Catholic enclaves in the Protestant states, and of large Protestant 
enclaves in the Catholic states. To some extent, therefore, by character- 
izing the states according to the nature of their religious majorities*; 
we are committing an "ecological fallacy" (see Alker, 1969). We note 
here that it is a purposive "ecological fallacy", in that we assume that 
being a Protestant in a predominantly Catholic state is a meaningful social 
fact, even if the city in which one lives is predominantly Protestant. We 
acknowledge the existence of political influences of one's neighbors and 
~ssociates -- the social networks Bithin the territorial boundaries of 
cne's neighborhood (Segal and Meyer, 1969; Segal and Wildstrom, 1970). 
We suggest that there may be an additional effect attributable to being a 
??ember of a religious minority in the context of the larger social milieu. 
Our analysis of status inconsistency in the Catholic states included 
respondents living in Saarland , Nordrhein-Westf alen , Rheinland-Pf alz , and 
,Bavaria. Catholics were coded as members of the domixiant religion. Non- 
Catholics (Protestants, those reporting other religions or no religion) 
I .  
were coded as non-members. 
Table 6 presents mean partisanship scores by religion and by achieved 
etatus variables for respondents living in the Catholic states. As one 
would expect, Catholics are shown to be more conservative than Protestants 
i.n terms of pijlitical party preference. Similarly, conservatism increases 
, . 
with occupational -prestige, and with education (with reversals among those . . 
Gith the lowest 'leveis) . Income, which displays skire'ral reversals, has . .: . 
previously been shown not to have a significant main effect. 
Table 6 .  Observed Partisahship Means in Catholic States: Religion x 
Occupation, Religion x Education, Religion x Income 
Occupation ' Catholic Non-Catholic Total 
Self-employed, etc. 3.257 2.969 3.097 
Employees, etc. 2.918 2.851 2.894 
Workers 2.860 2.443 2.630 
TOTAL 2.950 2.676 
Education 
College preparatory 3.118 2.892 3.012 
Intermediate school 3.063 2.776 2.906 
Primary school with 
apprenticeship 2.891 2.570 
' 3.348 Primary school 
:. 
2.750 . .  ' , 3.036 
TOTAL 3.032 . 2.678 
Income 
>1,800 DM/mo. 3.071 2.840 2.954 
TOTAL 3.071' 2.840 
. Analysis :of variance of these data indicated significant main effects 
attributable to education, occupation, and religion. The effect of income 
was shown once more to be statistically insignificant, and all tests for 
. . statistical interaction.were insignificant. The ANOVA for main effects 
is presentedfin Table 7. The F-tests for the insignificant interaction 
model (AB) have been omitted in the interest bf simplifying the table. 
The analysis indicates clearly that the differences among means in Table 6 
can best be accounted for by the additive main effects of the component 
achieved and ascribedstatus variables. While the sums of squares are 
slightly larger for the interaction than for the additive model, the dif- 
ferences are attributable to sampling error. 
Table 7. Analysis of Variance for Party Identification in Catholic States: 
Religion x Occupation, Religion x Education, Religion x Income. 
Occupation Education Income 
ss* df** - SS - d f - SS - d f -
Total (T) 423.76 443 509.32 527 471.34 493 
Religion (A) 8.28 1 16.38 1 14.60 1 
Achieved .Status (B) 14.22 2 9.35 3 11.01 7 
Interaction (AB) 23.40 5 28.55 7 26.08 15 
Tests for Main Effects 
Sum of Degrees of Me an F-Ratio 
Squares Freedom Squares 
I. Occupation (A,B)-(A) 13.31 2 6.66 
Remainder T-(A,B,) 402.17 
Religion ( : k ; ~ )  - (B) 7.37 
Remainder T-(A,B? 402.17 440 0.91 8.09**** 
11. Education (A,B)-(A) 9.31 ' 3 3,lO 
Remainder (?~(A,B) 483.63 523 0.92 3.37***- 
Remainder T-(A,B> 483.63 523 0.92 17.76**** 
111. Income (A,B)-(A) 11.1 
Remainder T-(A,B) 445.64 
Religion (A,B) - (B) 14.69 
Remainder T-(A,B) 445.64 485 0.92 15.97**** 
" *Sum of Squares. ss differs among the three analyses because of differing n's. 
**Degrees of freedom 
*** p< .05 
The analysis of status inconsistency in the Protestant.states included 
xespondentsiivi~g in Schlieswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Neidersax~ri, Bremsn, 
and .Hessen, The stace of s ad en-~urtenbur~ also has a Protestant. numerical 
majority. However, the margin was so small that we could not.define either. 
major religious group as dominant. We .therefore left this scat€ out of our 
status inconsistency analysis. In the Protestant states, Protestants were 
. . 
coded as members of the dominant religion, and non-Protessants (Catholics 
and those reporting other religions or no religion) were coded as non-mem- 
bers, Table 8 presents mean partisanship scores by religian and by achieved 
atatus variables for respondents living in the Protestant states, Occu- 
pation is once again seen.to be related to conservatism, although only a 
trace of the relationship appears among the non-Protestant minority, Educa- 
tion, on the other hand, is more strongly correlated with political eonser- 
,vatism among non-Protestants than among Protestants. Income again has 
:2 dLc-ra.l ,,.- - reversals. Most interesting, perhaps, is that the greater conser- 
vatism of non-Protestants (most of whom are Catholic) is ncwhere nesr as 
great in the Protestant as in the Catholic states. In only 7 of the 15 
possible comparisons in Table 8 are the,non-Protestants the more conservative 
of the two groups. 
Table 8- Observed Partisanship Means in Protestant States: Religion x 
Occupation, Religion x Education, Religion x Income 
Occupation Protestant Non-Protestant. TOTAL 
Self-employed, etc. 3.586 3.000 3.460 
Employees, etc. 2.873 3.000 2.899 
Workers 2,531 2 a 933 2,641 
TOTAL 2.838 2.965 -. 
College preparatory 3.000 
Intermediate school 2.841 
Primary school with 
apprznticeship 2.952 
Primary school 3.000 
TOTAL 2.894 
Table 8. cont. 
Protestant Non-Protestant TOTAL 
. Income 





601- 800 DM 
401- 600 DM 
4 400 DM/mo. 
TOTAL 2.895 2.955 
The ANOVA for main effects of occupation, income, and religion is presented 
in Table 9. 
Table 9. Analysis of Variance for Party Identification in Protestant States: 
Religion x Occupation, Religion x Income 
Occupation Income 
sum of degrees of sumc of degrees of 
squares freedom squares freedom 
Total (T) 230.91 
Religion (A) .71 
Achieved Status (B) 17.19 
MCA (A,B) 19.54 
Interaction (AB) 21.95 
Tests for Main effects 
sum of 
squares 
I. Occupation (A, B) -(A) 18.83 
Remainder (T)-(A,B) 211.37 
Religion (A,B) - (8) 2.35 
Remainder (T)-(A,B) 211.37 
11. Income (A, B) - (A) 2.25 
Remainder (T)-(A,B) 275.20 
Religion (A,B) - (B) .80 
Remainder (T) - (A, B) 275.20 
















.91 2.57 n.8. 
.38 
.99 .38 n.s. 
.80 
.99 .81 n.s. 
Again,'the F- tests for the interaction model (AB) are omitted in the 
interest of simplifying the table. The interaction model did not explain 
significantly more variance in partisanship than did the additive model. 
Also omitted from this table is ANOVA and F- tests:for education x religion. 
Because of statistical anomalies, the ANOVA sum of squares for these vari- 
ables was greater than the MCA sum of squares, making analysis difficult, 
and results unreliable. 
A somewhat different pattern appears here than was present in the 
Catholic states. Most strikingly, the re'ligious differences do not approach 
statistical significance in the Protestant states. That religion operates 
differently in protestant than in catholic states suggests..'that we did well 
to~look at the two types of geographical units separately since higher 
order interaction effects are find'icated,. It must be noted that they 
are not the interaction effects specified by the status inconsistency model. 
Secondly, the effect of occupation on partisanship, observed for the 
Federal Republic as a whole and for the Catholic states, appears in the 
Protestant states as well: 




This analysis has been concerned with three questions. First, does 
occupational class continue to be a basis of partisan cleavage in a society 
whose major party of the left has been undergoing an embourgeouisement in 
response to an expansion of salaried middle-class, relative to working 
class, strata. Secondly, what role does religion play in partisan dif- 
ferentiation in modern Germany. Third, do models of social structure that 
posit statistical interaction effects given us greater explanatory power 
than more parsimonious additive models. 
The answer to the first question is clearly affirmative. Among the 
variables we have considered here, occupation stands out as the single 
strongest determinant of political party choice. Where the SPD in the past 
gained support from the geographical mobility of the labor force from 
agricultural occupations to urban working-class occupations, it seems to have 
substituted support based on shifts from-:-entrepreneurial to salaried 
middle-class occupations. 1n.bothrfathers and-sons generations, we see 
middle-class~employees manifesting political preferences to the left of 
those of the self-employed. Similarly in both Catholic and Protestant 
states, this difference appears'among middle-class members of the dominant 
(although not the subordinate) .religious group. The important planc of 
cleavage for the dominant re1igion.i~ still one of the employers vs.,em- 
ployees, but the distinction betweerblue-collar and white-collar occupa- 
tions has- diminished in-import. For:the. minority religions, however, the 
blue-collar white-collar distinctton remains primary. 
The answer to our second question is also affirmative, but qualified. 
In the Federal Republic as a-whole,:we find religion to be.significantly 
related to political partisanship. However, when we view Catholtc and 
Protestant states separately, wcfind.that.the relationship holds true in 
the former, but-not.in.the latter;.. We have no explanation to offer for this 
phenomenon. Indeed, we find it 'strange in view of the support that the 
electoral system gives tothe-as'sociation between church and party. 
~lections are. held on Sunday in .the -Federal Republic and Catholics, at the 
very least, can-generally expect-to.be. reminded from the pulpit to remem- 
ber their-sectarian interests-when.'they.go .to the polls. We would have 
expected;if any differences among-:states.were apparent, that Catholics would 
more strongly pressed'to'dtfferentiate themselves politically from Protes- 
.tants in states where they were-a-.minority than where they were dominant. 
The third question receives'an-unequivocal.negative response. The 
logical elegance of formulations that-posit "mobility effects" or "incon- 
sistency effects" fails 'to hold up under-the weight of our German data. We 
find that additive models of the-effects.of social structure on German 
politics account most parsimoniously for the explained variance in political 
party choice. 
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